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Transitional Labour Markets, from theory to policy application. 
Transitional Labour Markets and Flexicurity: 
Managing Social Risks over the Lifecourse1 
Günther Schmid2 
Abstract  
This article presents a conceptual approach related to the European flexicurity 
debate, the Transitional Labour Market (TLM) theory and its main 
assumptions. The aim is to bring this analytic framework into the discussion 
and to clarify some central aspects by defining the key concepts of flexibility 
and security and by demonstrating the possible interplay of both dimensions. 
After explaining the empirical assumptions and laying the normative 
foundation, employment policy strategies following this concept are developed 
and illustrated by good practices from European member states. It is shown 
that the TLM-theory is a useful approach, as a comprehensive conceptual 
system emphasising labour market transitions during the lifecourse.  
Keywords: Transitional Labour Markets, employment, flexibility, security 
Les marchés transitionnels du travail, de la théorie à la pratique. Les 
marchés transitionnels du travail et la flexicurité : gérer les risques sociaux 
tout au long de la vie 
Résumé 
Cet article présente une approche conceptuelle liée au débat européen sur la 
flexicurité : les “Marchés Transitionnels du Travail ». Le but est d’introduire 
ce cadre analytique dans la discussion afin de clarifier le contenu conceptuel 
de la flexibilité et de la sécurité et de montrer les possibles interactions entre 
les deux dimensions. Après avoir expliqué les présupposés empiriques et les 
fondements normatifs, on développe et on illustre les stratégies d’emploi qui 
suivent ce concept. Le texte met en évidence l’apport de ce système conceptuel 
compréhensif qui se centre sur les transitions se déroulant sur le marché du 
travail tout au long de la vie. 
Mots clé : Marchés transitionnels du Travail, emploi, flexibilité, sécurité 
JEL Classification numbers:  J08, J13, J2, I38 
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1. Does a European Flexicurity Consensus Emerge? 
When the idea of balancing flexibility and security was introduced by the 
first Kok Report (Kok 2004) into the employment policy debate at the end 
of 2003, “flexicurity” was still considered as an oxymoron, which means 
something that is a contradiction in itself.3 Only a few years later, in its 
2006 Employment Report, the European Commission appealed to the 
strategy of flexicurity in the following way: 
"A consensus is […] emerging […] that countries should adopt institutional 
configurations in the labour market that better combine the requirements of 
flexibility and security – in other words ’flexicurity’. This implies that, in an 
environment where workers experience more frequent transitions between 
employment and non-employment, and between different kinds of employment, 
policies need to put in place the right conditions for individuals to successfully 
manage these transitions, thereby ensuring sustainable integration and progress of 
individuals in the labour market” (European Commission 2006, p. 111). 
Related to the “right conditions”, the Commission submitted a Green 
Paper in November 2006, asking member states and social partners to take 
a position on 14 questions on modernising labour law. This process was 
supported by a Task Force on flexicurity which delivered its report in 
2007. On the basis of this report, the Commission announced four 
components of flexicurity in July 2007: (1) flexible and reliable 
contractual arrangements, (2) comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, 
(3) effective active labour market polices, and (4) sustainable social 
protection systems. Across the board of these four principles, the 
Commission emphasised always the important role of the social partners, 
which could justify seeing this as a fifth principle pf the Commission. 
After a lengthy debate, the European Council eventually decided on eight 
common principles of flexicurity in December 2007 (European 
Commission 2007). 
These principles already contain a good deal of compromise between the 
various schools of flexicurity (Auer 2007), and within these principles one 
can easily detect some key elements of the transitional labour market 
concept. In brief, the eight principles emphasise (1) good work through 
new forms of flexibility and security; (2) a deliberate combination of the 
                                                 
3 As many other social inventions, the term – of course – has been invented by the Dutch; see for 
its history Wilthagen (1998). 
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four flexicurity components; (3) a tailored approach according to the 
member states’ specific circumstances; (4) overcoming segmentation 
through stepping stones and through managing transitions both in work 
and between jobs; (5) internal as well as external flexicurity; (6) gender 
equality in the broader sense of reconciling work, family and private life; 
(7) the crucial importance of the social dialogue in implementing 
flexicurity, which means – in transitional labour market terms – negotiated 
flexibility and security; and, finally, (8) fair distribution of costs and 
benefits, which means – in the wording of social risk management – the 
fair sharing of risks in critical transitions over the lifecourse.  
However, the ongoing debate shows that the concept of flexicurity is far 
from unitary. Despite a common rhetoric, country-specific connotations 
exist, and there is the danger that the concept becomes instrumental for 
various and even contradicting political interests.4 The concept of 
transitional labour markets (from now on TLMs) aims at providing a 
consistent framework to give flexicurity a clear direction. The first step of 
such a framework is to clarify the meaning of flexicurity from an 
analytical point of view. 
2. Ways in which to ‘Marry’ Flexibility and Security 
The confusion stems especially from the complexity of the 
interrelationship between flexibility and security. At least four elements 
for each dimension can be distinguished: external or internal numerical 
flexibility and internal or external functional flexibility on the one hand, 
and job security, employment security, income security and option 
security on the other hand.5 The link between these eight dimensions is 
more complicated than is usually considered (Figure 1). 
The flexibility-security nexus is not always a trade-off. The employer’s 
flexibility gain does not necessarily mean a loss of security for employees; 
and the employee’s security gain does not necessarily mean a loss of 
flexibility for employers. Employers also have an interest in security, for 
instance in the loyalty and reliability of workers. Employees, vice versa, 
also have an interest in flexibility, for instance in working-time flexibility 
to combine family, life and work, or in job changes to gain new 
experiences, to extend social networks and to indulge changing 
preferences.  
                                                 
4 See the unsurpassed and lucid epistemological reflections by Barbier (2007, 2008).  
5 For a slightly different categorization see Wilthagen and Tros (2004). 
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Figure 1: The flexibility-security nexus 
 Security 
 
Flexibility 
 
Job  
security 
Employment 
security 
Income 
security 
Option 
security 
External numerical to to / vt / vs to / vt / vs to 
Internal numerical vt vt (to) / vt to / vt 
Internal functional vt vt to / vt (to) / vt 
External functional vt to / vt / vs to / vt to / vt 
to = trade-off; vt = virtuous circle; vs = vicious circle 
Take, for instance, the first column of the flexicurity matrix, the nexus 
between job security and various forms of flexibility. There is clearly a 
trade-off between job security and external numerical flexibility: the more 
freedom employers have to hire and fire, the lower the job security is for 
individual employees and vice versa. If, however, employees trade in 
internal flexibility (for example, accepting working time variability and 
wage flexibility) against job security, flexibility and security may turn into 
a virtuous circle.  
Job security can also induce employees to be loyal to the employer, to 
invest in firm-specific human capital, to co-operate, and to pass over tacit 
knowledge to other employees because they do not have to fear internal 
competition. All this increases internal functional flexibility. An example 
of external functional flexibility would be the opportunity of employers to 
use high-quality job services provided by temp-agency work. The reason 
is that temp-agencies can pool the risk of fluctuating demand for such 
services and thereby provide security for the internal workforce of 
individual employers as well as job security for skilled workers in their 
own organisation. In other words, the flexicurity labour market will 
increasingly be characterized by hybrid employment relationships 
combining the advantages of internal and external labour markets. 
Regarding the link between external numerical flexibility and employment 
security, hire and fire does not necessarily affect employment security. If 
the labour market provides plenty of job opportunities, for instance 
through high job turnover combined with effective demand management, 
then flexibility and employment security can go hand in hand.  
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The nexus, however, can also be deadly vicious. Apart from rising 
fluctuation costs, hire and fire policies can lead to an overall feeling of 
employment insecurity. This feeling may lead, in turn, to exaggerated 
savings of employees, thereby lowering consumption and effective 
demand on the one hand, and on the other hand – as the case of East 
Germany has drastically shown – employment insecurity also leads to 
postponing family planning, thereby lowering the birth rate. In addition, 
employment insecurity also reduces the investment in human capital, 
thereby leading to a decline in highly skilled labour supply and eventually 
ending in a vicious circle of flexibility and security.  
These examples point out that the flexibility-security nexus should not be 
considered as a menu à la carte (Gazier 2007). Whether relationships 
between the different types of flexibility and security turn out to be trade-
offs, virtuous or vicious circles depend on the coherent design of labour 
market policy, especially the complementarity of institutions at the micro-, 
meso- and macro-level (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The Danish “Golden 
Triangle”, for instance, compensates the high risk of job insecurity with 
generous income security, and active labour market policies greatly 
contribute to employment security.6 Sweden is a good case of balancing 
option security and functional flexibility. Universal public child-care 
provisions and generous parental leave schemes there enhance 
employment options for men and women, whereas comprehensive 
education and training opportunities at all ages ensure adaptability to 
labour market changes.  
Figure 2 shows flexibility as the vertical axis and security as the horizontal 
axis in a continuum from the negative to the positive. This makes four 
possible combinatory relationships: two kinds of trade-offs, one in which 
the increase in flexibility goes at the expense of security, and one in which 
greater security goes at the expense of flexibility. And there are two 
complementarities: a virtuous circle, in which flexibility and security re-
enforce each other in a positive direction, and a vicious circle, in which 
flexibility and security re-enforce each other in a negative direction. 
                                                 
6 The best references for the Danish model are Bredgaard/ Larsson (2005) and Madsen (2006). 
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Figure 2: Combinations of flexibility and security 
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As in real marriages, most people probably like to have the best of all 
worlds, the virtuous circle. However, as was shown at the beginning, 
conflicts or trade-offs turn up as well and vicious circles loom large in real 
life. Each country will have to find its own ideal balance between 
flexibility and security. At the European level, one can only formulate 
some general guidelines. These guidelines can be divided into four stra-
tegies: protected flexibility (1), negotiated flexibility (2), negotiated 
security (3) and minimum standards (4), and all four strategies can be 
differentiated according to the level of policies – whether they work at the 
micro, meso or macro level of political activities (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Strategies for managing the balance between flexibility and 
security 
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(1)  Regarding the first priority, protected flexibility would be the proper 
way to foster a virtuous circle between flexibility and security. In general, 
this strategy compensates risk taking by additional securities or monetary 
incentives. 
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a)  From the macro perspective, the exchange of job security for high 
income security to foster job mobility would be one possibility to set the 
virtuous circle of ‘flexicurity’ in motion. In a knowledge and service 
based economy, especially in an economy with overwhelmingly small 
and medium-sized firms and network-like work organisation, the 
competitive pressure of globalisation requires more and more external 
flexibility. If one further assumes that higher job turnover affects 
especially low and medium-skilled people, the combination of generous 
income security with employment security through active labour market 
policy seems to be a promising strategy. This is exactly the flexicurity 
model of the Danes. Another way, the Dutch way, would be lifecourse 
saving accounts for covering income risks related to flexible employment 
contracts. The provision of efficient placement services, education or 
training services and transferable social securities are further cases of 
protected flexibility at this level.  
At the labour demand end, temporarily dispensing employers from the 
payment of contributions to social security would be a possibility to 
compensate for the high risks of employers recruiting young people 
looking for their first job, as for instance the Portuguese government 
recently did successfully.7 Moreover, the neglect of macroeconomic 
policy also leads to a lack of functional equivalents of labour market 
flexicurity on the demand side. Cheep consumer credits, tax subsidised 
learning accounts, inequality insurance and real estate price insurance 
would be examples for flexicurity on the demand side (Shiller 2003).8 
                                                 
7 This dispense (23.75% of the wages) for a maximum period of 36 months also holds for long-
term unemployed; more than 80,000 were covered in 2006 (Ministério 2007). 
8 Even if it had to be put in the US-context, of special interest and in the vein of Dworkin's concept 
of distributive justice is Shiller’s proposal of an inequality insurance. “The idea […] is that the 
government should set by legislation the level of income inequality, in most cases probably 
initially roughly equal to the level of inequality today, and create a tax system that prevents 
inequality from getting worse. The idea is that if income inequality begins to get worse, then taxes 
automatically become more progressive as a correction. The tax changes would be automatic 
because the tax would be framed as enforcing a measure of inequality rather than specifying tax 
rates. I am calling the program insurance, quite loosely, to frame the program in the public mind 
as the risk management vehicle that it is, and to highlight that it will not wrest from anyone from 
the standpoint of today. Inequality insurance is not a Robin Hood plot to take money from the rich 
and give it to the poor. Like other risk management devices it focuses only on protecting all of us 
from future risks” (149). That system would ultimately pay negative taxes to people of the lowest 
income. There is a risk, because the economy is a very unpredictable allocator across people. 
Especially in the rich countries, inequality is increasing. Advanced technology often means that a 
smaller number of skilled people supply their services over a wider area, producing a 
"winner-take-all" effect, where only the best do well, and these lucky few command enormous 
incomes (Shiller 2003, 149-164).  
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b)  At the meso level, collective agreements going beyond wages and 
covering also training funds and training leaves could foster a symbiotic 
relationship between flexibility and security. 
c)  At the micro level, civil servants can be regarded as the prototype for 
‘flexicurity’. This provocation can only be justified in referring to the 
original concept and not to the often degenerated practice of today. In the 
classical model the state did not guarantee job security to its high level 
civil servants. As an employer the state provided only employment 
security in exchange of the acceptance to take over all kind of jobs in the 
range of the servants’ ability, including the obligation of regional mobility 
without any limits. I will not recommend re-establishing this model. The 
institution of the ‘civil servant’, however, reminds us that employment 
security even with the same employer does not exclude contractual 
arrangements that enhance all kinds of internal and external flexibility. 
This is probably the reason why we find almost no change in the 
development of so-called job tenure. There is even evidence that long job 
tenure – in fact the better expression would be employment tenure – 
seems to foster productivity (Auer 2007). 
(2)  Second, the proper strategy to turn the flexibility-security trade-off 
into a win-win situation would be ‘negotiated flexibility’. 
a)  At the macro level, centralised wage formation through collective 
bargaining without interference of the state is the prototype for negotiated 
flexibility. However, one could imagine an innovative extension of this 
model: the social partners could negotiate an anti-cyclical wage flexibility 
scheme by putting – in case of an economic upswing – parts of the wages 
into a training fund which could then be used to finance continuous 
vocational education and training in the cyclical downturn; the state 
would jump in as co-financing partner by providing tax incentives for 
such funds. 
b)  Good practice at the meso level are collective agreements with open-
ing clauses at the firm level that under certain conditions allow wage 
flexibility in exchange of employment protection, so-called concession 
bargaining. Such negotiated flexibility can also be understood as a way to 
create procedural justice which – as we know from the new behavioural 
economics (e.g., Fehr and Falk 2002) and empirical research – is so 
important for the acceptance of wage flexibility, especially in case of 
downward wage adjustment. 
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c)  An example for good practice at the micro level would be the legal 
right to working time reduction under the condition that employees accept 
the voice of employers in negotiating the implementation of this right. 
The Netherlands and Germany have introduced such conditional rights. 
(3)  Third, the proper strategy to turn the trade-off between increasing 
security and decreasing flexibility into a win-win situation is ‘negotiated 
security’. 
a)  At the macro level, the so-called ‘soft jobs’ and ‘flexible jobs’ in 
Denmark are a good example. This type of jobs provides employment 
security for handicapped, disabled, hard-to-place people in exchange of 
the acceptance to change jobs or taking over jobs with lower res-
ponsibilities and corresponding lower wages. In addition, flexibility is 
enhanced through competitive bidding of public resources and negotiated 
out-contracting with municipalities or other organisations providing this 
type of jobs. 
b)  At the meso level, one could imagine collective agreements about 
flexible pension entitlements backed up by pension law that allow 
building up virtual time accounts (virtual contributions) that compensate 
for discontinuities during the lifecourse. 
c)  At the micro level, entitlements to career leaves (option security) in 
exchange of negotiated functional flexibility within the firm would be 
good practice. Another example are so-called activation contracts 
between authorised case managers and the unemployed in which the 
unemployed – before signing the agreement – have the opportunity to 
negotiate the conditions; also opening clauses for re-negotiation would be 
good practice. 
(4)  Fourth, the proper strategy to overcome vicious circles would be 
‘minimum standard regulation’ at national or European level. 
a)  At the macro level, national minimum wages (NMW) to avoid cut-
throat competition is a highly contested example. To turn this into good 
practice, it is necessary to include the social partners in the setting, 
differentiation and continuous adjustment of minimum wages. Although 
there is no reasonable argument for a unique EU minimum wage, the 
development of common rules for such a process should be considered. 
The institutionalisation of the Low Pay Commission (LPC) for setting and 
monitoring the British NMW is a good practice example. Evidence of 
about ten years experience shows, that the NMW raised the real and 
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relative wage of low paid workers (equity) without adverse employment 
consequences (efficiency) (Metcalf 2008). Due to the high risk of social 
exclusion through low skills, the issue of minimum standards for 
education at national or EU level may be even more urgent than 
considering standards for minimum wages. 
b)  At the meso level, European standards for running temp-agencies – 
especially by establishing the equal treatment principle – would be a 
precondition that these intermediate institutions can play a larger role in 
preventing downward spirals of flexibility and security through their 
capacity of risk pooling. 
c)  At the micro level, universal social rights beyond employment – for 
example rights to training, parental leaves, career leaves and giving 
workers voice at the firm level – can overcome the prisoners dilemma 
individual employers and employees are facing in case of non-cooperative 
games (Supiot 2001). This dilemma is the result of time incongruence, 
which means the fact that such rights usually induce higher short-term 
costs than benefits but higher long-term returns than costs. The uni-
versality of these rights could avoid opportunistic behaviour in favour of 
short-term solutions. 
To sum up, whether relationships between the different types of flexibility 
and security turn out to be trade-offs’, virtuous circles or vicious circles 
depends on the coherent design of labour market policy, especially the 
complementarity of institutions at the micro, meso and macro levels. The 
Danish ‘Golden Triangle’, for instance, compensates the high risk of job 
insecurity with generous income security, and active labour market 
policies greatly contribute to employment security. Sweden is a good case 
of balancing option security and functional flexibility. Universal public 
child-care provisions and generous parental leave schemes in Sweden 
enhance employment options for men and women, whereas 
comprehensive education and training opportunities at all ages ensure 
adaptability to labour market changes. 
The most important point of this exercise, however, is that the complexity 
of the flexibility-security nexus allows countries to choose different com-
binatory regimes (Klammer 2007). This conclusion has been confirmed by 
many other successful EU member states since the existence of the Lisbon 
strategy. However, the concept of TLM claims that a “deliberate 
combination” of the four flexicurity components – flexible and reliable 
contractual arrangements, comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, 
effective active labour market policies, and modern social protection 
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systems – means to follow consistent normative and analytical principles. 
The next section deliberates on the normative principles.  
3. The Theory of Transitional Labour Markets 
As a normative concept, TLMs envisage a new stage of active labour 
market policy which focuses on social risks over the lifecourse. The core 
idea is to empower individuals to take over more risks over the lifecourse, 
not only through making work pay but also through making transitions 
pay. Four principles underlie this theory.  
The first principle is justice understood as fairness. Concerning the goals 
of policy intervention, the concept of TLMs is opposed to the utilitarian 
assumption of maximising happiness for all. TLMs, rather, emphasise the 
difference principle by John Rawls (2001) according to which inequality is 
only justified if it improves the lot of the least advantaged. We have to 
change Tolstoy’s famous statement in his novel Anna Karenina: Each 
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. There are many ways to 
happiness, but pain is always the same. Reducing unhappiness, especially 
that caused by long-term unemployment is something that we can achieve. 
Maximizing happiness is a moving and often futile target, as the booming 
happiness research shows (Layard 2005, Offer 2006). 
The second principle is solidarity in risk-sharing. TLMs follow the ethic of 
responsibility by Ronald Dworkin (2000). Rights and obligations have to 
be balanced. Demanding more individual responsibility requires endowing 
all individuals with equal opportunities. It also requires the periodic 
redistribution of resources over the lifecourse, since market forces 
regularly distort distributive justice. 
The third principle is developing individual agency. TLMs assume great 
differences in the ability to utilise resources for a fulfilling personal 
lifecourse (Sen 2001, Salais and Villeneuve 2004). Labour market policy, 
therefore, has to concentrate on capabilities, which include individualised 
endowments of resources as well as a supportive social and political 
infrastructure.  
The fourth principle is transnational social cohesion. TLMs assume an 
increasing interdependency of national states through globalisation and 
internationalisation. The Europeanization of labour markets in particular 
requires a spatial expansion of the principle of social inclusion, in other 
words, an expansion of risk-sharing communities beyond ethnic, regional 
and national boundaries (Ferrera 2005). 
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As an analytical concept, TLMs emphasize the dynamics of labour 
markets. They focus on flows between different employment relationships 
rather than on stocks, and they focus on transitions over the lifecourse 
rather than on one way job-to-job changes. They distinguish especially 
between integrative, maintenance and exclusionary transition sequences or 
job careers. They have stimulated a rich set of empirical research on 
lifecourse mobility which cannot be presented here.9  
TLMs, however, also emphasise transitions within employment 
relationships. The often quoted fact that international research finds no 
remarkable downward trend in job tenure and no remarkable increase in 
job-to-job transitions is completely in line with the concept of TLMs 
(Auer and Cazes 2003). The reason is that many transitions can be 
performed within stable employment relationships, for instance the shift 
from full-time to part-time work due to parental leave, or the combination 
of part-time work with off-the-job training, or internal job rotation.  
Such flexibility within a continuing employment relationship explains, for 
instance, the fact that the nominal employment rate in Sweden is about 74 
per cent, whereas the effective employment rate – which means the rate of 
employed people who actually work in a week – amounts to around 64 per 
cent. This observation might even be turned into a normative statement: 
The more transitions there are within an employment relationship that are 
allowed or demanded, the higher the employment rate must be to keep the 
‘machinery’ of economic prosperity running. The Lisbon objective of a 70 
per cent employment rate, therefore, might be even too modest in the long 
run. 
The main challenge, however, is the imbalance between integrative, 
maintenance and exclusionary transitions. In fact, the current dynamics of 
transitions tends to lead to new forms of labour market segmentation. 
Many people get stuck in exclusionary transitions, especially in low 
skilled jobs or in precarious non-standard employment relationships. 
The following figure on the aggregate non-standard employment rates in 
the EU member states gives only a rough impression of this challenge. 
Non-standard employment here comprises all jobs either in part-time 
                                                 
9 See, among others, O’Reilly et al. (2000), Schömann/ O’Connell (2002), Schmid (2002a, b), 
Schmid/Gazier (2002), Mosley et al. (2002), Gazier (2003), Gangl (2003); Muffels/ Luijkx (2006), 
Román (2006), Schmid (2006), Howe (2007), and various contributions in four recently published 
rich volumes on flexicurity and transitional labour markets by Jørgensen/ Madsen (2007), de 
Koning (2007), Lassnigg et al. (2007) and Muffels (2008). 
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work, temporary work or own self-employment (without dependent 
employees). The comparison reveals three messages (Figure 4). 
First, as the clustering above the steady-state diagonal demonstrates, non-
standard employment increased in almost all EU member states, especially 
in the Netherlands, Spain and Italy. 
Second, as the clustering according to employment systems shows, the 
Nordic systems (the Netherlands as a hybrid system included) as well as 
the Anglo-Saxon systems are at the top; the Continental systems as well as 
the Mediterranean systems are in the middle, and most of the new member 
states are at the bottom. This pattern strongly correlates with economic 
prosperity in terms of GDP per capita and allows the following tentative 
conclusion: the more highly developed the employment systems are, the 
higher the contractual variety of employment relationships is.  
Figure 4: Aggregate non-standard employment rates in 1998 and 
2005 
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Source: EUROSTAT, Labour Force Survey; own calculations 
Aggregate Non-Standard Employment: 
-  Employees with a temporary contract 
-  Solo-self-employed working full-time outside agriculture 
-  Part-time workers with permanent contracts (employees) and part-time working solo-
self-employed persons who define themselves as part-time workers 
Third, the fact that Nordic as well as Anglo-Saxon systems rank highly in 
terms of non-standard employment can be taken as circumstantial 
evidence that non-standard jobs are related to very different regulatory 
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frameworks. Further, not all of these jobs are precarious or exclusionary. 
They can serve as stepping stones or as intermediary jobs within a 
meaningful work life career. Non-standard jobs, however, often involve a 
higher risk of exclusion than standard jobs. 
This increasing contractual variety of employment relationships is the 
empirical backdrop to the concept of transitional labour markets. Against 
this backdrop, the aim of TLMs is, metaphorically speaking, to provide 
“social bridges” that compensate for the higher risks of this increasing 
contractual variety and to ensure that non-standard jobs become “stepping 
stones” to sustainable job-careers. In order to establish such institutional 
arrangements, it is therefore helpful to think in terms of social risk 
management, which will now be explained and illustrated with some 
examples.  
4. Employment Strategies Following the Theory of TLMs 
TLMs concentrate on five critical events over the lifecourse: transitions 
from education to employment, transitions from one job to another, 
transitions between employment and unemployment, transitions between 
private household activities and gainful work, and eventually transitions 
from employment to retirement.  
Each of these transitions is associated with specific risks: First, the risk of 
too little or eroding human capital or income capacity over the lifecourse; 
second, the risk of income volatility due to fluctuating demand and job-to-
job transitions or even the risk of working poverty due to low wages; third, 
the risk of restricted income capacities due to social obligations such as 
child care or elderly care; fourth, the risk of income insecurity due to 
unemployment; fifth, the risk of reduced or zero income capacity due to 
disability, chronic illness or old age. 
The theory of TLMs assumes that specific risks also require specific 
securities. According to the principle of requisite variety (Ashby 1979), 
the higher the variety of risks the higher the variety of security provisions 
should be. The theory of TLM also rests on modern behavioural 
economics, notably on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 2001). It 
does not assume consistent rational behaviour but asymmetric risk 
perceptions. Loss aversion tends to be greater than risk taking for gains. 
People tend to be myopic when related to high risks with low 
probabilities, but far-sighted when related to low risks with high 
probabilities. As a consequence, many people tend to insure themselves, 
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for instance, against possible disruption of their travel plans but not 
against the possibility of long-term vocational disability; they are also less 
willing to save for any education or training that may be necessary in the 
future than to save for a new and maybe prestigious car. Social protection 
systems, therefore, often follow a logic that is too simple or that is 
different from that required by lifecourse risks. In the following, we 
present some of these systematic misfits and possible remedies.  
We thereby distinguish three strategies of social risk management: The 
prevention or the mitigation of risks, and the coping with risks. Prevention 
directly tackles the causes of risks and should therefore be given priority. 
However, uncertainty looms large and thus makes prevention impossible. 
Prevention can also be prohibitively expensive or restrict flexible 
adjustment. Mitigation and coping strategies, therefore, have to 
complement prevention.  
First, according to the principles of TLMs, it does not make sense to 
protect people against the risk of too little or of eroding human capital 
through high- and long-term unemployment benefits. On the contrary, 
such generous benefits would damage more than resolve the underlying 
problem. Equally, in-work benefits for unemployed youth would not make 
sense, since they would perpetuate the lack of human or social capital. 
Prevention is the main solution here. To prevent youth unemployment, 
social risk management must already start in the kindergarten, in pre-
schools and primary schools. Not only should equal opportunities in 
elementary and secondary education be adapted to a knowledge society, 
but also elementary social skills for communication and learning abilities 
have to be ensured.  
As mitigation strategy, it is of the utmost importance that the state ensures 
a training place or a job after six months of unemployment at the latest. 
All firms must share the risk of the lack of human capital and contribute at 
least financially to vocational training if they are not able or willing to 
offer the training themselves.  
Sufficient education and vocational training are a crucial element of active 
securities over the lifecourse. It is also a precondition for taking on more 
individual responsibility than in the traditional welfare state. To cope with 
this risk, active labour market policy, therefore, should ensure for 
everybody a second or third investment chance over the lifecourse.  
Sweden provided the best example in this respect. Between 1997 and 
2002, the Swedish government invested 350 million euros yearly for low-
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skilled people – independent of whether they were unemployed or 
employed – in order to lift their knowledge to a level appropriate to the 
knowledge economy (Albrecht et al. 2005). This allowed about 100,000 
people to get continuous vocational education and training in addition to 
the normal stock of trainees, which roughly corresponds to 2.5 per cent of 
the working age population. 
Second, income volatility over the lifecourse is often caused by externally 
induced job changes or externally enforced short-time work. Income 
volatility, however, can also be caused more and more by endogenous 
changes such as changing job preferences, family relocation or even the 
wish to take a sabbatical. Working poverty results if wages are so low that 
the wage income falls below a decent minimum income despite full-time 
work. A basic income guarantee, especially in old age, is a powerful 
preventative strategy to ensure income security for people with 
discontinuous lifecourses and related income volatility. The Netherlands 
and the Nordic countries offer good examples in this respect. Minimum 
wages also prevent working poverty, to some extent, through three 
channels: first, by protecting a basic level of decent wages, second by 
avoiding cut-throat competition and third by stimulating continuous 
investment in competitive workplaces. 
Long-term saving or lifelong learning accounts are proper strategies to 
mitigate and cope with volatile income risks. Since the resulting flexibility 
or mobility through such saving schemes creates positive external effects, 
the state could step in as a co-financing institution by providing tax 
incentives.  
The Dutch lifecourse saving plan (Wotschack 2006) and the Belgian 
career break system (Román 2006) are good practices that could be 
adopted by other EU member states. However, care has to be taken with 
respect to some flaws in the present design of these schemes. Young 
adults, especially, are usually in a lifecourse phase in which they are not 
able to build up enough savings. Education and care credits might be 
arranged to cope with the risk of low earning and saving capabilities. 
Third, if people’s income capacity is restricted, for instance due to family 
obligations, this risk has to be compensated by income supplements or in-
kind benefits. The best and most powerful preventative measures are the 
public provision, or at least public financing, of day-care facilities. In-
work benefits, including tax credits, are a proper instrument of risk 
mitigation, especially for low income earners. As a coping strategy, full-
time or part-time leaves from work due to social obligations should be 
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compensated like wage replacements in case of involuntary 
unemployment.  
Concerning good practice, some EU member states, for example Sweden 
and Denmark, have already arranged such schemes. The Grand Coalition 
in Germany recently introduced wage-related parental benefits 
compensating about 58 per cent of wages up to 14 months, two of which 
have to be taken up by men. Due to the high individual costs of child care, 
but also due to the high benefits of child care for the whole of society, and, 
last but not least, for reasons of gender mainstreaming, the wage 
replacement could even be more generous for low- and medium-income 
earners. Since children and frail grandparents often need care that cannot 
be planned in advance, wage replacement for some days per year should 
be available. Sweden, for instance, acknowledges this need through a 
contingent of up to 60 days per year at a wage replacement of 80 per cent. 
Fourth, the proper response to the risk of income insecurity (caused by 
unemployment, for instance, through cyclical demand variations or 
through redundancy dismissals) is to provide for generous income 
security. It is of the utmost importance to consider income protection in 
this case not as a passive measure but as active security.  
First of all, however, preventative measures through job creation and 
continuous vocational education and training have first priority. Without 
thriving job dynamics and without employability that fits the requirements 
of the knowledge economy (Rodrigues 2002), income protection would 
indeed turn into a passive measure. The best income security measure for 
the involuntarily unemployed is the creation of new competitive jobs 
through a sound macroeconomic policy.  
If the risk, however, has occurred, the proper mitigating strategy is to 
compensate the income loss through generous unemployment benefits. A 
generous wage replacement allows the unemployed person to search for a 
new job that corresponds to his or her capabilities without the fear of 
getting trapped into a career of poverty. Generous wage replacement helps 
to maintain a worker’s qualifications and competence. It also improves the 
efficiency of job matching. High matching efficiency through 
unemployment insurance is, for instance, reflected in longer job tenures 
after the rematch of insured unemployed persons compared with uninsured 
unemployed persons. In its Employment Outlook 2007, even the OECD 
discovered by econometric work that reducing the generosity of 
unemployment benefits may induce some unemployed persons to leave 
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unemployment more quickly, but it also significantly reduces productivity 
(OECD 2007). 
Appropriate coping measures are intensive job search and case-oriented 
job placement services. Again, such services are an investment and not 
wasteful consumption. Many EU member states still underinvest in such 
services during the first months of unemployment. However, long-term or 
even unlimited wage-related unemployment benefits do not make sense 
for this risk category. Apart from inducing moral hazard, they would not 
help the long-term unemployed – far from it. 
Good practice in combining mitigation and coping measures in the 
management of redundancies is shown by the Austrian work foundations 
(‘Arbeitsstiftungen’) and the new Finnish measure “Change Security” 
(‘Muutosturva’). The Austrian practice is to set up a work foundation 
which functions as a kind of transition agency. These transition agencies 
ensure an integrated approach in terms of organizing and financing. The 
funding comes from four sources: First, the foundation’s capital is given 
by the firm, thus granting it its independence as long as it is needed. 
Second, the redundant workers themselves make a contribution by 
depositing 50 per cent of their redundancy payments into the foundation. 
Third, workers remaining in their positions pay the foundation a small 
proportion of their monthly wages as a solidarity contribution. Fourth, the 
public employment service guarantees the payment of unemployment 
benefits up to four years, which covers the majority of the costs. The 
foundation ensures an early start to reintegration and organizes a wide 
range of individualised services that are helpful when workers are seeking 
new jobs in the regional labour market. These characteristics lead to a very 
important consequence: firms that cause redundancies take over 
responsibility in a limited sense and workers that engage in retraining and 
placement activities are volunteers and get a strong start instead of 
suffering from the stigma of being redundant. Evaluations report 
reintegration success of up to 95 per cent.  
The Finnish “Change Security” programme was put in place in 2005 to 
address, in particular, large-scale redundancies. It aims at an early start to 
active measures in situations of mass dismissals and company closure 
through co-operation between different regional stakeholders. It includes 
the right of the employees to individual programmes or re-employment or 
re-education, free time for job searching and counselling while still on the 
job and higher levels of benefits in the transition period. It includes an 
obligation for employers to inform the employees and officials in time, 
and to make plans for re-employment together with the employees and the 
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local public employment office. First-hand experiences with this new 
programme report positive results and emphasize, in particular, the new 
levels of co-operation in labour market affairs between the key 
stakeholders.  
Fifth, it would be misplaced to protect the risk of reduced or zero income 
capacity due to disability or old age through long-term unemployment 
benefits. The use of unemployment insurance for early retirement was one 
of the greatest mistakes of several EU member states during the 1990s. 
This risk needs to be managed by other measures.  
Active labour market policy – if it deserves its name – should concentrate 
on prevention, since the causes of diminishing income capacities are well 
known. Income capacity, therefore, should and could be re-established 
through regular individual work assessments and corresponding training 
measures. Much can also be done through workplace adjustment. In other 
words: Not only do workers have to be made fit for the market, but also 
the market has to be made fit for the workers – a slogan aptly coined by 
Bernard Gazier (2007). 
The risk of reduced income capacity can also be mitigated through partial 
compensation of the related income loss. Such wage insurance would be 
an essential and innovative element of transforming conventional 
unemployment insurance into employment insurance. Workers who are 
mature adults, especially, need such insurance, since they face large 
income losses if they become unemployed and subsequently re-employed. 
This need is also nourished by the fact that internal labour markets that 
provide implicit wage insurance are becoming eroded. Furthermore, the 
escape to early retirement as an income insurance device is no longer an 
option. Wage insurance would increase workers’ willingness to take on 
lower-paid jobs, especially when it is combined with training vouchers to 
make the new jobs sustainable and to improve their chances of climbing 
up the career ladder again. 
Last but not least, individualised rehabilitation is still a much underutilised 
measure to cope with the risk of diminishing income capacity. Another 
possibility is the creation of transitional jobs, as is the case in most 
Scandinavian countries, especially in the form of the Danish ‘flexjobs’, or 
jobs created by various forms of social enterprises, as is the case, for 
instance, in Sweden and the Netherlands.10 Good practice is especially to 
                                                 
10 The target group of the Danish ‘flexjobs’ consists of persons with a permanently reduced work-
ability who are not entitled to pre-pensions. The employer receives a wage subsidy amounting to 
Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.75
 21 
be found in the comprehensive approach of active ageing in Finland, 
which succeeded in increasing the employment rate of elderly persons by 
18 percentage points within 8 years (Hartlapp/ Schmid 2008).  
5. Conclusions: From Activation to Work-life Orientation 
To sum up, modern labour markets, first of all, are characterised by an 
increasing variety of employment relationships. This variety reflects new 
modes of production due to new technologies, new forms of work 
organisation due to increasing competition and international labour 
division, and new work-life risks related to social and demographic 
changes. Taking all these features together, modern labour markets seem 
to need both more flexibility and new securities. The European 
employment strategy adopted the slogan of flexicurity as an answer to 
these new challenges.  
Second, flexicurity, however, is not and cannot be a unitary concept. The 
eight common principles of flexicurity for EU member states, now 
formulated by the European Council, are helpful in preventing an arbitrary 
usage or even political instrumentalization of the term. They rightly 
emphasise that EU member states have to find their own deliberate 
combination of flexible and reliable contractual arrangements, 
comprehensive lifelong learning strategies, effective active labour market 
policies, and sustainable social protection systems.  
Third, there is a lack of criteria for assessing equitable and efficient 
combinations of flexicurity arrangements. The call for a balance of 
flexibility and security is empty without such criteria. The concept of 
transitional labour markets provides a normative and analytical framework 
to develop such criteria based on a lifecourse orientation. From such a 
perspective, one has to ask: Why should income security only be related to 
the income risks of jobless people? Why should security not be provided 
for income risks related to critical transitions over the lifecourse? Why 
should insurance not cover the income risks related to transitions between 
family work and gainful employment, between dependent work and self-
                                                                                                                        
one third, one half or two thirds of the minimum wage depending on the extent to which the work-
ability of the person is reduced. The person in a ‘flexjob’ receives wage according to the collective 
agreement. The number of persons in such jobs rocketed recently to the level of 40,000, which 
would correspond in Germany to the level of 600,000, 1.5 per cent of the active labour force. As of 
January 2006, the Swedish ‘plusjob’ is an enhanced form of employment subsidy made available 
to 20,000 long-term unemployed men and women, targeted at quality-improving work in the 
public sector in order to minimize displacement effects. The employer receives a subsidy of 100 
per cent of the wage cost up to a specific ceiling.  
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employment, from high-paid to low-paid jobs, between full-time and part-
time work, from work to gradual retirement?  
From such a perspective, managing the balance of flexibility and security 
over the lifecourse requires a wider set of opportunities than just “making 
work pay”. It requires institutional arrangements that are also “making 
transitions pay”. Such arrangements contain at least three new institutional 
ingredients: first, new social rights that go beyond employment, for 
instance the right to training leaves, care leaves, intermediate working 
time reduction or even long-term sabbaticals; second, new forms of 
governance, especially arrangements that break with the traditional 
division between labour market and social policy (Supiot 2001). This 
requires intelligent network models of co-operation and co-financing 
beyond labour market agents; third, an extension of the social insurance 
principle to income risks beyond unemployment, which means to income 
risks also related to critical transitions over the lifecourse.  
Fourth, a way in which to extend the social insurance principle to a 
broader set of lifecourse risks than unemployment would be to establish a 
system of work-life insurance. Such a system would build on three pillars: 
first, a universal minimum income guarantee that ensures a life without 
persistent poverty; second, the extension of unemployment insurance to 
employment insurance; third, private or collectively negotiated insurance 
accounts targeted especially to lifecourse risks such as lifelong learning 
accounts, time-saving accounts or care-leave systems. Governments could 
join such ventures at various levels through tax subsidies, standard setting 
and co-financing partners. 
Fifth, the system of employment insurance would serve three functions: 
generous income protection for a restricted period of time in involuntary 
unemployment; employment security through active labour market policy 
that is not only confined to offering jobs and placing individuals in work 
but that also supports follow-up measures to transform mere workfare 
measures into stepping stones to sustainable work; and finally better 
inclusion of non-standard workers in labour law and social security 
systems. One innovative element of employment insurance is the concept 
of wage insurance. Such insurance would cover, to some extent, the loss 
of wage income when changes of employment become necessary due to 
structural change, for instance trade adjustment, or due to the loss of 
individual productivity, for instance through attrition of work and income 
capacities. Acceptance of intermediate downward mobility should be 
rewarded by active labour market policy aimed to re-establish upward 
mobility.  
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Sixth, it must be kept in mind that stakeholders often have conflicting 
interests that cannot be explained away. The problem of divergent 
interests can only be solved through negotiation as a device of information 
gathering, communication and building compromises. The revitalisation of 
the social dialogue, in other words, negotiated flexicurity at all levels – 
firm, branch, nation and Europe – is therefore of the utmost importance for 
putting more flesh on the bones of the European employment strategy. 
Negotiated flexicurity, however, may lead to new insider-outsider 
cleavages, since organized interests may set compromises on the costs of 
less well organized interests. Care, therefore, has to be taken to avoid 
externalisation of social costs by setting minimum standards and fair rules 
of negotiation. The government at various levels may also jump in as co-
financing partner to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma in which rational 
actors choose a suboptimal equilibrium. 
Seventh, as the successful countries demonstrate, flexicurity has to be 
embedded in sound macro-economic and macro social policy. Without 
sustainable job creation dynamics, all employability and stepping-stone 
strategies are in danger of ending in a cul-de-sac or of displacing other 
categories of workers. Because Europeanization, in particular the 
Eurozone, increases interdependencies, co-ordinated efforts to stimulate 
sustainable economic growth are required, especially through investments 
in a better European economic and social infrastructure. The extension of 
the European Social Fund to a European Employment Insurance Fund, or 
at least a complementation of the European Social Fund by a focused 
European Knowledge Lift Fund, would make the European Social Model 
more visible and tangible.  
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